Violence, non-violence, and movement outcomes

Neil Lund

2024-11-19

Lethal Conflict

Forms of violent contention:

  • Riots and armed protests: spontaneous brawls, opportunistic looting,

  • Terrorism: non-conventional attacks intended to advance a political goal

  • Civil War: sustained organized violence between parties within a state

  • Revolution: complete overthrow of a government

    • (More restrictive definitions hold that revolution requires fundamental change to the constitutional order)

Lethal Conflict

Violence

Violence and conventional politics aren’t mutually exclusive!

  • Narodnaya Volya, considered the first “modern terrorist group”, viewed themselves as a political party

Violence

Violence and conventional politics aren’t mutually exclusive!

  • Narodnaya Volya, considered the first “modern terrorist group”, viewed themselves as a political party

  • Militant non-state actors often find themselves in a position to govern: Hamas, ISIS, the Tamil Tigers etc. have all had real or de facto states at some point

Violence

Violence and conventional politics aren’t mutually exclusive!

  • Narodnaya Volya, considered the first “modern terrorist group”, viewed themselves as a political party

  • Militant non-state actors often find themselves in a position to govern: Hamas, ISIS, the Tamil Tigers etc. have all had real or de facto states at some point

  • Political parties and movement organizations sometimes turn to violence tactics, or maintain militant and political wings simultaneously.

Distinguishing features

Many of the dynamics here are the same, but there are some differences of degree at least:

  • High stakes: perpetrators and victims have much higher costs for participation (or non-participation) compared to peaceful protests. Demands are also more likely to be absolutist: state overthrow, territorial control etc.

  • High barriers: sustained organized violence requires more resources, better coordination, more unity

  • High levels of institutionalization: militants are hard to disperse even after a conflict ends.

Why do conflicts become violent?

Why do groups turn to violence?

Grievance

  • While there’s not much support for “pathology”-based explanations, repression can de-legitimize the state and discredit non-violent activists

Hobbesian violence

  • Groups use political violence to settle long-standing grievances and private grudges

  • Weakened or resource-starved organizations are unable to maintain internal discipline

  • Opportunists take advantage of weak/indifferent states to seize territory or resources

. . .

TELLEZ JF. Land, Opportunism, and Displacement in Civil Wars: Evidence from Colombia. American Political Science Review. 2022;116(2):403-418. doi:10.1017/S0003055421001003

TELLEZ JF. Land, Opportunism, and Displacement in Civil Wars: Evidence from Colombia. American Political Science Review. 2022;116(2):403-418. doi:10.1017/S0003055421001003

Regime Type

Resources

  • In general: non-violence requires more participation. So unpopular groups are less able to take advantage of it.

  • External supporters may encourage violence regardless of impacts on the movement itself

  • The presence of “lootable” resources can lead groups to prefer a smaller coalition

Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza, Christian Lessmann, and Gunther Markwardt. “Natural resource rents and internal conflicts: Can decentralization lift the curse?.” Economic Systems 42.2 (2018): 186-205.

Group Dynamics

  • Moderates and radicals compete for support.

  • Both repressions and concessions can shift the balance toward violent actors

African National Congress

  • Segregation and inequality during British colonial era

  • ANC founded in 1912 to lobby for black interests

  • 1948 elections lead to a formalization and expansion of these policies under the rubric of apartheid

The ANC: Defiance campaign 1952-1960

  • mass campaign of non-violent resistance, partly inspired by Indian anti-colonial movement
  • led to massive increase in support for the ANC from black South Africans
  • But no meaningful reform

The Sharpeville Massacre

  • South African police open fire on a group of pass card protesters, killing 69

  • The government responds to subsequent protests by banning the ANC and PAC and detaining leaders

The ANC: uMkhonto we Sizwe

  • ANC responds by forming a militant wing translated as “Spear of the Nation” to engage in sabotage and potentially guerrilla warfare

  • Receives funding and support from USSR and recently independent African states

At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the government met our peaceful demands with force. — Nelson Mandela

The ANC: uMkhonto we Sizwe

  • Mandela arrested in 1962

  • Most of the ANC leadership arrested in 1963

  • Remaining leadership operated in secret or abroad through 1960s to 1990s

Competition

Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania broke away from the ANC over differences surrounding multiracialism

Armed Propaganda

  • Following the Soweto Uprising in 1976, mass non-violent (or at least unarmed) struggle became more central
  • But the ANC augmented these efforts with renewed “armed propaganda”

Dynamics

  • Grievances: the Sharpeville Massacre and rejection of the Defiance Campaign
  • Regime type: mixture of democratic and authoritarian elements
  • Resources: external support from Eastern bloc and from neighboring states/exiles
  • Competition dynamics: Pan Africanist Congress and black nationalism